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Herbert Eli Scarf (born on July 25, 1930 in Philadelphia, PA) is a distinguished 
American economist and Sterling Professor (Emeritus as of 2010) of Economics 
at  Yale  University.  He  is  a  member  of  the  American  Academy  of  Arts  and 
Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences and the American Philosophical 
Society. He served as the president of the Econometric Society in 1983. He 
received  both  the  Frederick  Lanchester  Award  in  1973  and  the  John  von 
Neumann Medal in 1983 from the Operations Research Society of America and 
was elected as a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association in 
1991. 
 
Scarf  never  received  formal  training  in  economics.  Both  his  undergraduate 
training at Temple University and his graduate work at Princeton University 
were in mathematics. For the past five decades, however, he has worked at 
the frontiers of both economic theory and operations research and has made a 
number of extraordinarily significant contributions to both of these fields. He is 
internationally  famous  for  his  early  epoch-making  work  on  ) , ( s S  optimal 
inventory policies and his highly influential study with Andrew Clark on optimal 
policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem, which initiated the important 
and flourishing field of supply chain management. Equally, he has gained world 
recognition  for  his  classic  study  on  the  stability  of  the  Walrasian  p rice 
adjustment processes, his fundamental analysis (with Gerard Debreu) on the 
relation between the core and the set of competitive equilibria (the so-called 
Edgeworth  conjecture,  named  after  the  Irish  economist ,  Francis  Ysidro 
Edgeworth, Feb 8,1845-Feb 13,1926), his remarkable sufficient condition (i.e., 
balancedness) for the existence of a core in non-transferable utility games and 
general exchange economies, his seminal paper with Lloyd Shapley on housing 
markets,  and  his  pioneering  study  on  increasing  returns  and    models  of  
*I am deeply grateful to Herb Scarf for many enlightening conversations on the subject of this paper and 
for sharing his personal story of a remarkable journey.  production in the presence of indivisibilities. All in all, however, the name of 
Scarf is always remembered as a synonym for the computation of economic 
equilibria  and fixed  points.  In the early 1960s  he  invented  a path-breaking 
technique for computing equilibrium prices. This method is nowadays known 
as Scarf’s algorithm and has made general equilibrium theory applicable to 
large, realistic economic problems. This work has generated a major research 
field  in  economics  termed  Applied  General  Equilibrium  Analysis  and  a 
corresponding  area  in  operations  research  known  as  Simplicial  Fixed  Point 
Methods (or Algorithms). Scarf’s algorithm and its subsequent refinements and 
alternatives have become practical tools for assessing the consequences for 
the  entire  economy  of  a  change  in  the  economic  environment  or  a  major 
change in economic policy – to engage in comparative statics when the model 
of  equilibrium  is  too  large  to  be solved  graphically  or  by simple  numerical 
calculations. 
 
Early life and Education 
 
Scarf was born on July 25, 1930, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to parents of 
Ukrainian Jewish origins. His father Louis Harris Scarf immigrated to the United 
States in 1905 from Ukraine at the age of 18 and his mother Lena Elkman also 
came to the US in the same year at the age of 5. They married in 1929 and had 
two twin sons next year: Frederick Leonard Scarf and Herbert Eli Scarf. Herbert 
and  Frederick  went  to  the  same  public  primary  and  high  schools  in 
Philadelphia. Herbert Scarf became very interested in mathematics in his early 
adolescence after reading the book: Men of Mathematics by E.T.Bell. He began 
to  read  calculus,  geometry,  number  theory  and  theoretical  mechanics  by 
himself  in  high  school.  Herbert’s  teachers  at  the  South  Philadelphia  High 
School apparently did not know he had such avid mathematical interests, and 
were  astonished  when  he  was  ranked  first  in  the  Pennsylvania  Statewide 
Mathematical  Tournament  for  high  school  students  organized  by  Temple 
University in 1947. 
 
Herbert Scarf and his brother Frederick went to Temple University in 1948 for 
their undergraduate education. During their undergraduate studies, they lived 
with their parents and commuted by subway between their parents’ house and 
the university. Their father had a small business but was hit badly by the Great 
Depression and did not quite recover from it. 
 
At Temple University, Herbert Scarf chose mathematics as his major subject. 
He  started  to  attend  graduate  courses  on  Real  and  Complex  Variables, Analysis, Probability Theory, and Statistics in his sophomore year. He vividly 
remembers  one  of  the  faculty  members  of  the  mathematics  department, 
Professor Marie Wurster, who was very kind to him, always encouraged him 
and spent an enormous amount of time talking to him about mathematical 
topics. In 1950, he placed in the top 10 of the 1950 William Lowell Putnam 
Mathematical  Competition,  the  major  mathematics  competition  among 
universities in the United States and Canada. 
 
In the fall of 1951, Herbert Scarf got a scholarship from Princeton University 
and went there for his graduate training in mathematics, whereas his brother 
Frederick  went  to  MIT  for  graduate  study  in  physics.  Frederick  ultimately 
became a distinguished space scientist – he unfortunately died in Moscow at 
the early age of 57. 
 
Among  Scarf’s  many  classmates  at  Princeton  were  Ralph  Gomory,  Lloyd 
Shapley, John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Serge Lange and John Milnor. He also 
met Martin Shubik who was then a graduate student at the Department of 
Economics. At that time John Nash and Harold Kuhn had already left Princeton, 
but  Scarf  often  saw  them  during  their  regular  returns.  At  Princeton,  Scarf 
became a close friend of Gomory – they remain friends after these many years 
and often meet each other. When Scarf was at Princeton, he did not study 
game theory or economics but knew Martin Shubik, Lloyd Shapley, and John 
Nash who were actively involved in the early development of game theory. 
 
After World War II, Princeton had become a sanctuary for a large number of 
world leading scientists who had escaped from Nazi occupied Europe. Among 
them were Albert Einstein, John von Neumann, and Kurt Gödel. Scarf often 
saw  Einstein  strolling  with  Gödel  from  Einstein’s  office  at  the  Institute  for 
Advanced  Studies  to  his  house  on  Mercer  Street.  Einstein  always  smiled 
benignly but his friend Gödel rarely did. 
 
Scarf published his first scientific article ``Group invariant integration and the 
fundamental theorem of algebra” in the Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, in May, 1952. He attended Professor Saloman Bochner’s lectures 
about Haar Measure on Compact Topological Groups. One day Scarf made a 
sudden connection between this topic and a quite distant theme that he had 
been thinking about for quite some time.  As a result he proposed an entirely 
novel  proof  for  the  fundamental  theorem  of  algebra,  stating  that  every 
polynomial in a single variable has at least one complex root. 
 Scarf’s academic adviser was Saloman Bochner. Scarf admired Bochner and 
maintained  a  good  relationship  with  him  until  his  death  in  1982.  Other 
professors in the Department of Mathematics were Emil Artin, William Feller, 
Ralph  Fox,  Solomon  Lefschetz  and  Albert  Tucker.  Scarf  wrote  his  PhD 
dissertation on partial differential equations over manifolds and received his 
PhD in 1954. 
 
Career at Rand, Stanford, and Yale 
 
Scarf  worked  at  Bell  Labs  in  the  summer  of  1953  and  travelled  every  day 
between  Princeton  and  the  laboratory  with  John  Tukey,  an  eminent 
statistician. At Bell Labs Scarf encountered Claude Shannon, the inventor of 
information  theory.  In  June  of  1954,  Scarf  left  Princeton  to  join  the  Rand 
Corporation.  He  chose  Rand  instead  a  more  conventional  academic  job, 
because he desired to be involved in applied rather than abstract mathematics. 
The Rand Corporation was founded by the US Defense Department in 1948 in 
order  to  apply  a  variety  of  analytical  tools  to  the  economic,  political  and 
strategic problems of the Cold War and provided an ideal environment for 
researchers with applied interests. 
 
Among his colleagues at Rand were Lloyd Shapley, George Dantzig, Richard 
Bellman, Ray Fulkerson and Lester Ford. Dantzig, the inventor of the simplex 
method, had arrived a bit earlier and was applying  his methods to a large 
variety  of  basic  problems.  Bellman  was  trying  to  formulate  and  solve  all 
possible  optimization  problems  with  a  dynamic  structure  as  dynamic 
programming  problems.  Fulkerson  and  Ford  were  working  together  on 
network flow problems which became the springboard for the flourishing field 
of combinatorial optimization. At Rand, Scarf worked with Shapley on games 
with partial information and differential games with survival payoffs and was 
occasionally joined by John Nash when he visited as a consultant. This activity 
resulted in two early papers of Scarf and Shapley on game theory. 
 
At Rand, Scarf was first assigned to the Mathematics Department but after a 
year  the  organization  was  visited  by  a  budgetary  crisis  and  Scarf  was 
transferred to the Department of Logistics - a junior subset of the Department 
of Economics. His colleagues in the logistics group were mainly concerned with 
maintenance, repair, scheduling and inventory management which had little to 
do with the economic and strategic questions of the Cold War. Scarf was not 
assigned to any specific research topic. He learned about inventory problems 
by himself and wrote his first paper in this field. He met Samuel Karlin and Kenneth  Arrow  at  Rand.  They  were  both  interested  in  inventory  problems 
(Arrow had already written a remarkable paper on inventory theory with Harris 
and Marschak) and they invited Scarf to spend the academic year of 1956-1957 
at the Department of Statistics, Stanford University. 
 
At  Stanford,  Scarf  worked  intensively  on  inventory  problems  and 
demonstrated his extraordinary analytical skill and penetrating discernment on 
the nature of fundamental problems, when he published his two epoch-making 
papers on dynamic inventory problems: the first (1959) is on the optimality of 
) , ( s S policies  and  the  second  paper  (1960),  with  Andrew  Clark,  on  optimal 
policies  for  a  multi-echelon  inventory  problem.  Scarf  also  collaborated 
intensively with Arrow and Karlin on inventory problems. This collaboration 
resulted  in  three  landmark  volumes:  Studies  in  Mathematical  Theory  of 
Inventory and Production, 1958, Contributions to the Theory of Inventory and 
Replacement, 1961, and Multistage Inventory Models and Techniques, 1963. 
Arrow and Karlin also became Scarf’s good friends and mentors. 
 
Scarf’s visit was originally for a single year but the invitation was extended and 
in the fall of 1957 he was appointed as assistant professor in the Department 
of Statistics and subsequently an associate professor until he left Stanford in 
1963. While working on inventory problems, Scarf became very interested in 
economics from discussions with Arrow and Hirofumi Uzawa and by attending 
the seminars on Mathematics in the Social Sciences organized by Arrow, Karlin 
and  Patrick  Suppes.    He  was  particularly  fascinated  by  general  equilibrium 
models which he considered to be the central paradigm of economic theory. 
 
In 1958 and 1959, Arrow and Leonard Hurwicz published two basic papers (the 
latter one with Robert Block) in Econometrica. They proved that the Walrasian 
price  adjustment  process  formalized  by  Paul  Samuelson  (1941)  converges 
globally to an equilibrium for exchange economies with divisible goods when 
all goods are gross substitutes. It was much speculated that such processes 
would converge in any reasonable economy with divisible goods. But Scarf 
(1960) soon dashed such hopes by  producing a simple example with three 
consumers and three commodities that was globally unstable. This was Scarf’s 
first  classic  article  in  economic  theory  and  was  the  very  beginning  of  his 
remarkable career in the economics profession. 
 
On  Charles  Tjalling  Koopmans’  invitation,  Scarf  spent  the  academic  year  of 
1959-1960 at the Cowles Foundation at Yale University.  Koopmans, whom 
Scarf had met earlier at Rand, became a very close friend and mentor of Scarf. During his visit Scarf gave a seminar talk on his counter-examples. The seminar 
was chaired by James Tobin who was then the director. Among his audience 
were Gerard Debreu, Donald Hester, Alan Manne, Art Okun, Edmund Phelps, 
Bob Summers, and Jascha Marschak. During the same academic year, Scarf was 
invited to give a talk at Columbia University on his counter-examples. His old 
colleague Martin Shubik was in the audience. After the talk Scarf and Shubik 
took a long walk from 125
th street to Shubik’s apartment in Sutton Place, New 
York. During the walk, Shubik passionately talked about and tried to persuade 
Scarf to solve the so-called Edgeworth conjecture that the core of an exchange 
economy would converge to its set of competitive equilibria if the number of 
traders in the economy tends to infinity. 
 
Shubik’s enthusiasm sparked Scarf’s interest in this question and he started 
thinking seriously about the topic. He read von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
book: The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Edgeworth’s analysis of 
the  contract  curve  with  two  goods  and  two  types  of  traders  in  his  book: 
Mathematical  Psychics,  and  Shubik’s  1959  paper  on  this  subject.  Several 
months  later  a  decisive  moment  came  when  Scarf  found  a  way,  albeit 
extremely  complicated,  of  proving  the  Edgeworth  conjecture;  see  his  1961 
paper: ``An analysis of markets with a large number of participants”. Debreu 
subsequently improved Scarf’s argument and published it in his 1963 paper: 
``On a theorem of Scarf”. But a significant simplification of Scarf’s argument 
came when Scarf met Debreu on one occasion in December 1961, as Debreu 
eloquently described it in his 1983 Nobel Prize lecture: ``Associated with our 
joint paper is one of  my vivid memories  of  the instant when a problem is 
solved. Scarf, then at Stanford, had met me at the San Francisco Airport in 
December 1961, and as he was driving to Palo Alto on the freeway, one of us, 
in  one  sentence,  provided  a  key  to  the  solution;  the  other,  also  in  one 
sentence, immediately provided the other key; and the lock clicked open.” This 
collaboration yielded their 1963 paper: ``A limit theorem on the core of an 
economy,” which is one of the most fundamental results in general equilibrium 
theory. It is an important milestone for at least three reasons: First, it provides 
an important justification for the assumption of perfect competition that is 
fundamental in the treatment of neoclassical economic equilibrium models; 
second, it shows that competition and cooperation are just two sides of a coin 
for  economic  activities  under  the  right  circumstances;  third,  it  became  the 
starting point for a large literature on the core equivalence. 
 
In  1963,  Scarf  moved  to  the  Cowles  Foundation  and  the  Department  of 
Economics at Yale University and was appointed as a full professor. In 1979 he became a Sterling Professor--the highest recognition for academic staff at Yale. 
He was the Director of the Cowles Foundation for the periods of 1967-71 and 
1981-84.  Since  1963  Scarf  has  remained  at  Cowles  except  for  visiting 
appointments  at  Cambridge,  Stanford  and  other  institutes.  He  found  the 
environment  at  Cowles  extremely  suited  to  him,  as  he  describes  it  in  the 
preface of his 1973 book: ``The standard of mathematical rigor and clarity of 
thought which prevail at Cowles are well known to the economics profession. 
But perhaps more important is the persistent though subtle suggestion that 
the highest aim of even the most theoretical work in economics is an ultimate 
practical applicability.” 
 
During  his  first  few years  at  Cowles  Scarf  concentrated  on the  problem  of 
finding a method for  computing economic equilibria. His work on the core 
equivalence result had suggested a roadmap. If he could find a way to calculate 
a point in the core of a game based on a general equilibrium model, then this 
method would serve to find an approximate equilibrium allocation, at least in 
an economy with a large number of traders. This activity resulted in the first 
major core existence theorem for a large class of cooperative games without 
side payments. He proved that an N-person game has a nonempty core if the 
game is balanced. Scarf’s first proof of this theorem relied on Brouwer’s fixed 
point theorem, but his hope was to provide a numerical method for computing 
a point in the core, making no use of fixed point theorems. Good fortune loves 
those  who  are  well-prepared.  Robert  Aumann  was  visiting  the  Cowles 
Foundation during the academic year 1964-65. Scarf described his problem to 
Aumann, who suggested that he take a look at a recent paper by Lemke and 
Howson (1964). In this article, they proposed an algorithm for computing a 
Nash  equilibrium  in  a  finite  two  person  non  zero-sum  game.  In  a  single 
evening, Scarf realized that he could directly translate the Lemke-Howson’s 
algorithm through a limiting process into an elementary and constructive proof 
of  his  core  existence  theorem. This  result  was  reported in his  1967  classic 
article:  ``The  core  of  an  N-person  game,”  and  became  one  of  the  most 
important theorems in cooperative game theory. 
 
Having found an algorithm for the core, in November of 1965, Scarf finally 
realized that he could explore this technique to design a novel algorithm for 
approximating  equilibrium  prices  directly,  without  relying  on  the  relation 
between the core and the competitive equilibrium. This path-breaking work 
marked the successful culmination of his long battle for transforming abstract 
general equilibrium analysis into a practical tool for the evaluation of economic policy. The result is published in his 1967 article: ``The approximation of fixed 
points of a continuous mapping.” 
 
Since the early 1970s, Scarf launched his longest, hardest and most ambitious 
struggle:  to  tackle  economies  with  indivisibilities,  increasing  returns  and 
nonconvexity.  In  fact  in  1963  he  already  wrote:  ``Notes  on  the  core  of 
production economy,” which was widely circulated but was not published until 
1986. In this note, he studied economies where the production set exhibits 
increasing returns.  He showed that if the production possibility set satisfies 
customary properties, but is not a cone, then there is a collection of consumers 
with conventional preferences and specific initial endowments for which the 
core  is  empty.  His  seminal  article  with  Shapley  in  1974:  ``On  cores  and 
indivisibilities,” marked the first victory in his battle tackling indivisibilities and 
has become a most-cited classic article in the field. 
 
In the 1940s and 1950s, Dantzig and Koopmans had developed the activity 
analysis model of a production possibility set with constant returns to scale. 
When factor endowments are specified, the model leads directly to a linear 
program which can be solved by Dantzig’s simplex method. The method makes 
use  of  competitive  prices  to  test  for  the  optimality  of  a  proposed  feasible 
solution. 
 
However,  neither  decreasing  returns  nor  constant  returns  reflect  economic 
reality.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  the  1760s, 
economies of scale and increasing returns based on large indivisible pieces of 
machinery or forms of productive organization such as the assembly line are 
prominent  features  of  every  industrialized  nation.  Unfortunately,  economic 
theory based on the assumption of convexity and perfect divisibility does not 
offer any clue to this challenging economic problem. The difficulty of dealing 
with  indivisibilities  has  long  been  recognized  by  many  leading  economists 
including Lerner (1944), Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), and Debreu (1959), 
as  Lerner  (1944)  points  out:  ``We  see  then  that  indivisibility  leads  to  an 
expansion  in  the  output  of  the  firm,  and  this  either  makes  the  output  big 
enough to render the indivisibility insignificant, or it destroys the perfection of 
competition. Significant indivisibility destroys perfect competition.” 
 
Scarf was interested in economies with indivisibilities in production, i.e., where 
activity  levels  are  constrained  to  be  integers,  an  extreme  form  of  non-
convexity. When factor endowments are specified we are lead to the general 
integer program for which there is no pricing test to detect whether a feasible production plan is indeed optimal. His major goals have been (1) to replace the 
pricing test by a local neighbourhood search and (2) to develop a mechanism 
for  efficiently  finding  this  test  set.  In  the  early  1980s,  he  made  a  decisive 
victory  in  achieving  his  first  goal.  Using  his  early  concept  of  primitive  sets 
arising in his research on the core and the computation of equilibria,  Scarf 
succeeded in developing a quantity test set. He proved that this test set is 
unique and minimal, depending on the technology matrix alone and not on the 
specification of the particular factor endowment. It consists of a finite number 
of integral production plans. When this test set is available, one can easily use 
it to verify if a production plan is optimal or not, and if it is not optimal, one 
can use the test set to obtain a better production plan. 
 
Scarf has worked with a group of mathematicians on this subject for many 
years. He has found several important special classes of technology matrices 
for which the test set can be easily identified. However, important questions 
remain open and the battle is not yet over, as he states in his 1983 Presidential 
Address  of  the  Econometric  Society  (1986,  Econometrica):``At  the  present 
time, I am far from being able to present a convincing argument which relates 
the structure of neighbourhood systems (i.e., test sets) to the administrative 
arrangements that might be taken by a large industrial enterprise.” Up to this 
very moment, his struggle goes on. Indeed, as a Chinese poem says: ``An old 
war-horse may be stabled, yet still it longs to gallop a thousand miles; and a 





1.  ) , ( s S Optimal Inventory Policies 
 
Every organization encounters inventory problems of one kind or another. 
Consider  a  typical  situation:  A  retailer  faces  uncertain  demand  for  its 
product from customers over time. He has to pay a reorder cost and a unit 
cost when he orders the good from its producer. Over time, he also needs 
to pay the holding cost of its inventory and a shortage cost if the good runs 
out of stock. The retailer’s problem is to determine how much to order in 
each period of time so as to minimize expected cost. Scarf (1958) solved the 
problem in a characteristic manner by introducing a generalized notion of 
convexity, called   K convexity. Given a constant  , 0  K a function  ) (x f  is called  K -convex if,  K a x f
b
b x f x f
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[ ) (  for all positive  a,b 
and all  . x   Note that   0 convexity is equivalent to ordinary convexity. 
 
Scarf  demonstrated  inductively  that  the  minimum expected cost  was  K- 
convex and that the optimal policy for the dynamic inventory problem is 
given,  for  each  period  of  time,  by  a  pair  ) , ( s S   of  numbers.  If,  at  the 
beginning of an ordering period, the stock has fallen below the lower level, 
s,  it is optimal for the retailer to raise  the stock to  the  upper  level, S, 
otherwise no order is placed. The cost functions may be shown to be K - 
convex under a variety of conditions – for example whenever holding and 
shortage costs are linear, more generally, convex. Thus  ) , ( s S  policies are 
optimal for many practical dynamic inventory problems and have become a 
benchmark solution in inventory management.  ) , ( s S  policies had been used 
in  practice  for  many  years.  Their  operating  characteristics  were  first 
discussed in Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951), but the proof of optimality 
was first provided by Scarf. 
 
2.  Optimal Policies in Multi-echelon Inventory Problems 
 
Clark and Scarf (1960) were the first to study a multi-echelon inventory 
problem  and  initiated  the  field  of  supply  chain  management.  They 
considered a general situation in which there are several installations, say 1, 
2, …, N, with installation 1 receiving stock from 2, with 2 receiving stock 
from 3, etc. If installation k-1 places an order from installation from k, the 
length  of  time  for  the  order  to  be  filled  is  determined  not  only  by  the 
natural delivery time between these two sites, but also by the availability of 
stock  at  installation  k.  The  problem  is  to  determine  optimal  purchasing 
quantities at each installation when delivery times, purchase costs, demand 
distributions, holding and shortage costs and other parameters are given. 
 
They proved that the optimal policies for the N installations can be found by 
solving  recursively  a  dynamic  programming  problem  in  which  the  value 
function depends on the inventory levels at each installation and the orders 
from  successive  installations  which  have  not  yet  been  delivered.  Their 
important  contribution  was  to  demonstrate  that  under  certain  plausible 
conditions,  the  value  functions  can  be  decomposed  into  the  sum  of 
functions  of  a  single  variable,  each  of  which  satisfies  its  own  recursive 
equation which can be solved easily. 
 3.  Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium 
 
Consider a situation: Several traders each bring his/her bundle of goods to a 
market place and wish to exchange their goods. In the general equilibrium 
model,  the  exchange  takes  place  at  prices  that  equilibrate  demand  and 
supply for every good. How are these prices to be found? 
 
The market is guided by an invisible hand - a price adjustment mechanism - 
to an equilibrium state. You examine each good in the market and increase 
the price of the good if its demand is more than its supply but decrease its 
price if the relation holds the other way. Léon Walras had proposed the first 
such process in 1874, and Paul Samuelson formalized such a procedure as a 
system of differential equations in 1948. 
 
Arrow and Hurwicz (1958), and Arrow, Block and Hurwicz (1959) found that 
the price adjustment process proposed by Samuelson always converges to 
an equilibrium if the goods are gross substitutes. It was then speculated 
that the same process would work for any reasonable market of divisible 
goods.  Scarf  (1963)  dashed  such  hopes  by  showing  a  series  of 
counterexamples among which the first example involves three consumers 
and three complementary commodities, and has a unique equilibrium. He 
demonstrated that  if the initial  price vector  is not  the  equilibrium price 
vector, this process will generate a cycle of non-equilibrium price vectors 
and never converge to the equilibrium. 
 
4.  Core and Competitive Equilibrium Equivalence 
 
Consider an economic system composed of many self-interested individuals 
each of whom is endowed with a bundle of goods, has preferences over the 
available  bundles  and  wishes  to  achieve  a  maximal  satisfaction  by 
exchanging  his/her  own  goods  with  others.  The  system  requires  every 
individual  to  respect  the  private  ownership  and  the  voluntary  and  non-
coercive trade rule. Given this system, what will be a natural outcome of 
chaotic and countless independent actions of these self-interested agents? 
Adam Smith in his book ``The Wealth of Nations” (1776) first recognized 
how the invisible hand - a competitive market mechanism - can reconcile 
the complicated and conflicting forces of self-interested agents and guides 
the system to an equilibrium. The equilibrium is a state in which there exists 
a system of prices (i.e., market-clearing prices) at which every agent gets a 
best bundle of goods under his/her budget constraint and the supply of each good meets its demand. The list of the bundles obtained by all agents 
in the equilibrium state is called a competitive equilibrium allocation and is 
a redistribution of all agents’ initial endowments of goods. Wald (1936), 
Arrow  and  Debreu  (1954),  and  McKenzie  (1959)  among  many  others 
established  fundamental  results  on  the  existence  of  competitive 
equilibrium.    The  assumption  of  perfect  competition  or  price-taking 
behaviour  is  crucial  in  these  analyses.  It  essentially  requires  that  the 
influence of every agent in the system should be negligible. 
 
Another equally appealing and natural outcome of the economic system 
was  first  proposed  by  Francis  Edgeworth  in  his  book  ``Mathematical 
Psychics’’ (1881), and is now known as the core allocation (in the case of 
two goods, it is any point in the contract curve of  the Edgeworth box). 
Formally, a redistribution of all agents’ initial endowments of goods among 
all  agents  in  the  system  is  a  core  allocation  if  no  group  of  agents  can 
redistribute  their  own  initial  endowments  among  themselves  so  as  to 
improve the satisfaction of someone in the group without impairing that of 
any other in the group. Clearly, a core allocation is Pareto efficient in the 
sense that there is no way to make some agent better off without making 
any  other  worse  off.  It  is  now  well-known  that  every  competitive 
equilibrium allocation must be a core allocation but a core allocation need 
not  be  a  competitive  equilibrium  allocation.  Edgeworth  worked  with  an 
economic system consisting of only two agents and two goods, and then 
replicated  the  economy  many  times.  What  he  found  is  that  as  the 
replication tends to infinity, the set of core allocations converges to the set 
of  competitive  equilibrium  allocations.  This  result  provides  a  perfect 
justification  of  price-taking  behaviour  but  in  a  very  specific  setting. 
However, Edgeworth’s approach is based on the geometrical picture of the 
Edgeworth box and cannot be applied to the general case involving more 
than two agents and more than two types of goods. The general case is 
known  as  Edgeworth  conjecture  and  remained  widely  open  for  many 
several decades. 
 
Based  on  the  earlier  paper  of  Scarf  (1962),  Debreu  and  Scarf  (1963) 
resolved  the  outstanding  theoretical  problem  in  a  brilliant  and  elegant 
manner.  They  started  with  a  general  economy  consisting  of  any  finitely 
many agents and a finite number of goods and proved that if one replicates 
the  economy  infinitely  many  times,  then  the  set  of  core  allocations 
coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. This offers an 
impeccable validation of perfect competition in a most general and most natural setting. This study has spawned a large body of literature on the 
relationship  between  the  core  and  the  set  of  competitive  equilibrium 
allocations. One of the most significant contributions to this literature is the 
paper of Aumann (1964).  Having heard Scarf’s discussion on his original 
1962 paper at a conference at Princeton in 1962, Aumann established a 
model of pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents in which the 
core and the set of competitive equilibrium allocations are the same. 
 
5.  The Core of an N-Person Game 
 
The  problems  of  resource  distribution  in  an  economic  system  may  be 
resolved by the tool of competitive equilibrium theory or by more general 
and more flexible techniques of game theory. In a competitive equilibrium 
setting,  every  consumer acts  in response to  a set of  prices  by choosing 
bundles to maximize her utility under her budget constraint and every firm 
selects  production  levels  at  which  the  highest  profit  is  achieved  .  The 
system reaches an equilibrium at which consistent production plans and 
allocation of goods are made and all participants are in harmony with one 
another. When these economic problems are studied in the framework of 
game  theory,  we  need  to  specify  a  set  of  production  and  distribution 
activities  available  to  each  possible  coalition  of  economic  agents.  It  is, 
however, often sufficient and also convenient to summarize the detailed 
strategic possibilities open to each coalition by a set of possible utilities that 
can be achieved by the coalition. A stable and desirable outcome of the 
system is a core allocation of the game which assigns every agent a utility, 
and from which neither any individual agent nor any group of agents will 
have incentive to deviate. Scarf (1967) studied this problem and provided 
sufficient conditions under which a core allocation always exists. 
 
Formally, Scarf considers the following general game with a finite number 
of agents.  Let N denote all the agents in a system who are engaging in 
some  business,  economic,  or  political  activities.  These  agents  are  called 
players and each nonempty group of players is called a coalition.  For each 
coalition  , N S   let 
S R  stand for the Euclidean space of dimension equal to 
the number of players in  S   and whose coordinates are indexed by the 
elements in  S . Each coalition  S  is associated with a set  ) (S V  of possible 
utility vectors which can be achieved by the coalition if all players in the 
coalition cooperate. The set  ) (S V  is a subset of 
N R  and the i-th component 
i x  of each element  ) (S V x  indicates a utility for player  . S i  The following 
assumptions are made on the sets  ) (S V :  
1.  For each coalition,  ) (S V  is closed and bounded from above. 
2.  If  ) (S V x  and 
N R y  with  i i x y   for all  S i , then  ) (S V y . 
 
We say that a utility vector  ) (N V x  is blocked by a coalitionS  if there exists 
a utility vector  ) (S V y   such that  i i x y    for all  S i .  That is, when the 
coalition cooperates, every player in the coalition can actually achieve a 
higher utility than that given by  x. A utility vector in ) (N V  is in the core if no 
coalition can block it. An intriguing and fundamental question is what kind 
of game has a nonempty core. To answer this question, Scarf introduces the 
class of so-called balanced games. 
 
A family   of coalitions in the game is said to be balanced if there exist 
nonnegative numbers ) (S  , for every coalition S  in , such that   1 ) (  
  S i
S   
for every  . N i  (Any partition of the grand coalition N is a simple example of 
a balanced family.) The game is said to be balanced if for every balanced 
family  , a utility vector  u must be in   ) (N V  if  u is in  ) (S V  for every 
coalition    S .  Scarf  proved  the  following  theorem  based  on  a  finite 
algorithm. 
 
Scarf’s Theorem: Every balanced game has a nonempty core. 
 
6.  Scarf’s Combinatorial Lemma 
 
To prove his core existence theorem on the balanced game, Scarf (1967) 
introduced an elegant and  fundamental  combinatorial  lemma  which has 
found applications in various subjects. 
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The matrices  A and  Care said to be in standard form if for every row  i, 
) , ( i i c   is the minimum of the elements in its row, and if for every non -
diagonal element  ) , ( j i c  in the square submatrix of  Cformed by the first  n 
columns, and for every k  with  m k n   , we have  ) , ( ) , ( k i c j i c  . 
 
Scarf’s Lemma: Assume that  A and  C are two  m n matrices in standard 
form,  and  that  b  is  a  nonnegative  vector  such  that  the  set } , , 0 | { b Ax and x x   is bounded. Then there exists a feasible basis for the 
system  of  linear  equations  0 , ,   x and b Ax ,  so  that  if  we  define 
) , ( min j i c ui   for all columns  j in this basis, then for every column  k , we 
have  ) , ( k i c ui   for some index i. 
 
7.  The Computation of Economic Equilibria 
 
Scarf’s  book  ``The  Computation  of  Economic  Equilibria”  (Yale  University 
Press, 1973) is considered his magnum opus. It is a monumental work both 
in  economic  theory  and  in  applied  mathematics.  Scarf  ingeniously 
developed the first general constructive method for the explicit numerical 
solution to the neoclassical model of economic equilibrium and has made it 
possible to transform such a model from an abstract representation of an 
economy  into  realistic  models  of  actual  economies,  permitting  us  to 
evaluate  the  effects  of  significant  changes  in  the  environment  and  in 
economic policies. 
 
One of the central themes of economic theory is that the behaviour of a 
highly complex economic system can be seen as an equilibrium outcome 
arising from the interactions of many individuals within the system with 
different and even conflicting interests and motivations. This fundamental 
idea  was  first  formulated  by  Walras  (1874)  and  further  significantly 
developed by Wald (1936), Arrow and Debreu (1954), and McKenzie (1959) 
among many others as the neoclassical model of competitive equilibrium. 
When cast in a mathematical form such a model will become a system of 
highly nonlinear equations with multiple variables which represent prices 
of goods and services in the studied economy. The typical argument for the 
existence  of  a  solution  in  this  system  is  to  apply  Brouwer’s  fixed  point 
theorem (1912) - a fundamental theorem in mathematics which, however, 
does not offer any effective numerical solution. Brouwer’s theorem states 
that every continuous function 
n n S S f  :  mapping from a unit simplex 
n S  
into itself must have a fixed point
* *) ( p p f  , where  } 1 | {
1






n n x R x S is 
the  unit  simplex  whose  elements  are  non-negative  and  the  sum  of  all 
components equals one. As soon as we know a fixed point for the function 
constructed  from  the  studied  economy ,  we  know  its  correspond ing 
equilibrium in the economy. 
 
Scarf  proposed  an  algorithm  for  calculating  a  fixed  point  as  stated  in 
Brouwer’s theorem. As a result, he gave the first constructive proof for Brouwer’s theorem which is a major tool for establishing the existence of a 
solution to problems arising in various subjects. Scarf’s algorithm can be 
described as follows.  One first subdivides the unit simplex 
n S into a finite 
simplicial subdivision. Each subsimplex is  the convex hull of  its vertices. 
Then one assigns each vertex a label from the set  } ,..., 2 , 1 { n , where the label 
of  each  vertex  x  is  given  by  } 0 ) ( | min{ ) (    j j x x f j x l .  By  definition, 
0  j x implies  . ) ( j x l   A labelling rule with this property is said to be proper. 
According to a remarkable combinatorial theorem called Sperner’s lemma 
(1928),  if  we  are  given  a  simplicial  subdivision  of  a  unit  simplex  and  a 
proper labelling rule, there always exists a completely labelled subsimplex, 
i.e., a simplex each of whose n vertices carry a distinct label. 
 
It is easy to show that  if the labels are correctly selected,  a completely 
labelled subsimplex contains an approximate fixed point of the function. 
The finer the subdivision, the better will be the approximation. Now the 
problem of finding an approximate fixed point is to search for a completely 
labelled subsimplex.  Unfortunately, the original proof and its subsequent 
arguments for Sperner’s lemma were inductive in nature and thus virtually 
impossible to implement. Scarf (1967, 1973) introduced an effective and 
finite algorithm that can always find a completely labelled subsimplex. 
 
The basic idea of Scarf’s algorithm can be clearly illustrated for  2  n  and 
the  same  logic  applies  to  higher  values  of  . n   We  can  embed  the  unit 
simplex  in a larger simplex as shown in Figure 1. The larger simplex is 
subdivided by linking its three new vertices with the vertices lying on the 
boundary of the original unit simplex. Each of the new vertices can be 
labelled by 1, 2, or 3 in such a way that no additional completely labelled 
simplex is created. This construction makes it very easy to find a triangle 
whose  three  vertices  carry  two  of  the  three  desired  labels.  Scarf’s 
algorithm begins with the triangle whose two vertices are the vertices of 
the larger simplex and bear labels 1 and 2, as shown in Figure 1. Then the 
algorithm generates a sequence of adjacent triangles, each of which has 
vertices  labelled  1  and  2.  The  sequence  is  uniquely  determined  by  the 
initial triangle. When the algorithm enters a new triangle, it exits through 
an edge whose vertices bear labels 1 and 2, which is different from the 
edge used to enter the triangle. If the triangle is not completely labelled, 
there will be a unique other edge whose vertices carry labels 1 and 2, and 
the algorithm leaves this edge to move into a new triangle. Remarkably, 
this algorithm will never return to any triangle that it has previously visited. Since the number of the triangles is finite, the algorithm must terminate 
with a completely labelled triangle. 
 
The argument for  the convergence can be vividly described with a tale 
(Scarf (1973, p.48)):  We can think of the larger simplex as a house, and of 
its triangles as rooms. A room has a door if the two vertices of one of its 
edges bear labels 1 and 2. It is clear that a completely labelled triangle is a 
room with only one door, all other rooms have either two doors or no door 
at all. By the construction, the house has precisely one door leading to the 
outside.  Scarf’s  algorithm  begins  with  the  known  outside  door  and 
proceeds from room to room, never departing from a room by the door 
used in entering it. The algorithm can never return to a room previously 
entered nor leave the house, and therefore must find a room with only one 
door—precisely  a  completely  labelled  simplex!    This  idea  has  been 
explored  to  create  the  so-called  Sperner  Game  (Kyle  Burke 
http://www4.wittenberg.edu/academics/mathcomp/kburke  and  Shang-
Hua Teng http://www-rcf.usc.edu/%7Eshanghua/). 
 
 
Figure 1: The Illustration of Scarf’s Algorithm 
 
Scarf’s algorithm has initiated a major research field in economics known as  
Applied General Equilibrium Analysis (see Shoven and Whalley (1992)) and a 
corresponding  area  in  operations  research  termed  Simplicial  Fixed  Point 
Methods or Algorithms (see Todd (1976) and Yang (1999)). 
 
8.  The Housing Market 
The  assumption  of  perfect  divisibility  is  essential  in  neoclassical 
economic  analysis.    However,  this  assumption  often  contradicts  our 
casual  observation  of  economic  reality.  In  fact,  many  traded commodities  are inherently indivisible, such as  houses  and  cars.  In a 
pioneering article (Shapley and Scarf (1974)), Scarf and Shapley studied a 
market with a finite number of traders, each with a single indivisible 
good  (e.g.,  a  house)  that  they  wish  to  exchange.  Each  trader  has 
preferences over houses but has no use for more than one item. There is 
no money or other medium of exchange so the only effect of the market 
activity  is  to  permute  the  indivisible  goods  among  the  traders  in 
accordance with their purely ordinal preferences. With the aid of Scarf’s 
core existence theorem they proved that this market always possesses a 
core allocation--a redistribution of items among all traders that cannot 
be improved upon by any individual, or any group of individuals. To find 
a core allocation, they also  introduced a mechanism  -  called the top 
trading cycle method which had been discovered by David Gale. 
 
The mechanism works as follows: 
Each  trader  i  points  to  the  trader  j  whose  house  trader  i  likes  best. 
Clearly, there is at least one cycle of traders such that each trader most 
prefers the house owned by the subsequent trader in the cycle. The 
mechanism assigns every trader in the cycle the house he likes best, and 
removes all of the members of the cycle from the market. The remaining 
traders  repeat  the  same  process  until  every  trader  is  accounted  for. 
Remarkably it is now known that when faced with this mechanism, it is 
in the best interest of every trader and every group of traders to act 
sincerely  –  there  are  no  gains  to  be  made  by  misrepresenting  an 
individual’s preferences. 
 
9.   Production with Indivisibilities and Integer Programming 
The  assumption  of  convex  production  sets  plays  a  pivotal  role  in 
neoclassical economic theory. If the production possibility set is convex 
then  any  efficient  production  plan  will  be  supported  by  a  set  of 
competitive prices. The simplex method proposed by George Dantzig is 
an  effective  device  for  discovering  these  prices  from  the  underlying 
linear programming problem. Unfortunately, such prices will no longer 
exist  when  the  production  set  displays  increasing  returns  to  scale, 
indivisibilities,  or  other  forms  of  nonconvexity.    The  most  important 
example of a production set with indivisibilities is an activity analysis 
model in which all activity levels are constrained to be integers rather 
than  arbitrary  real  numbers.  Production  sets  with  indivisibilities 
represents the most extreme form of nonconvexities in production and 
correspond to integer rather than ordinary linear programming problem. In this case, there is no simple test, like the pricing test arising from 
convex production sets, to verify whether a production plan is optimal or 
not. 
 
To study this problem, Scarf (1981, 1986) developed an entirely different 
analytical  apparatus-called  a  neighbourhood  system,  to  replace  the 
pricing  test.  Consider  a  general  integer programming  problem  of  the 
form: 
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where  n x x x ,..., , 2 1 are integers.  For each integral vector  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n h h h h  , 
the neighbourhood of the vector h is 
a finite set of  integral  vectors  ) (h N   satisfying the two conditions:  (i) 
) 0 ( ) ( N h h N   , and (ii)  ) (h N k   implies  ). (k N h  
 
The first condition indicates that for any two different integral points, 
their  neighbourhoods  are  translates  of  each  other,  and  the  second 
condition shows the symmetric property of the neighbourhood system. 
Each  element  in  ) (h N  is  called  a  neighbour  of  . h  If  we  are  given  a 
feasible solution x to the above integer program we can test its set of  
neighbours x+h, for h in N(h), to see if one of them is feasible and yields 
a higher value of the objective function. If none of them is feasible, then 
x  is  a  local  maximum  with  respect  to  this  neighbourhood  system. 
 
Scarf has shown that under mild conditions on the technology matrix 
) ( ij a A there  is  a  unique,  smallest  neighbourhood  system,  with  the 
property that a local maximum is always global. This unique minimal 
neighbourhood system depends only on the technology matrix and not 
on the factor endowment. Thus to verify whether a production plan is 
optimal, one just needs to check if all its neighbours are either infeasible 
or  yield  an  inferior  value  of  the  objective  function.   Therefore  the 
minimal  neighbourhood  system  provides  a  unique  quantity  test  for 
optimality in the case of a production set with indivisibilities analogous 
to the pricing test in the case of  a convex production set.  Scarf (also 
together with his coauthors) has identified many important classes of production technology matrices for which the minimal neighbourhood 
system can be easily computed. 
 
Scarf’s  neighbourhood  system  has  found  applications  in  a  variety  of 
different  areas:  Algebraic  Geometry,  Cooperative  Game  Theory, 
Reliability Theory Multi-Commodity Network Flows, Graph Theory and 
the Stable Paths Problem. However, it is difficult to find the minimal 
neighbourhood system associated with an arbitrarily given technology 
matrix  and one is  forced to  use computational  procedures  borrowed 




Scarf  met  Margie  Klein  a  month  or  so  before  his  graduation  from  Temple 
University in 1951, and married her in 1953. They have three daughters and 
eight grandchildren. Maggie Scarf (her maiden name is Margaret Klein) is a 




Herbert  Scarf  was  intellectually  influenced  by  Kenneth  Arrow,  Saloman 
Bochner  (Scarf’s  PhD  adviser),  George  Dantzig,  Gerard  Debreu,  Tjalling 
Koopmans, and Maxwell Scarf (Herbert Scarf’s uncle). Scarf has deep respect 




Scarf is a superb teacher and adviser, a concerned and dedicated colleague, 
and  has  been  an  inspiration  and  role  model  to  his  students  at  Yale  and 
Stanford and to his colleagues all over the world. His clarity of thought and 
vision and thoroughness of knowledge are highly appreciated by his students 
and the readers of his work. He has supervised about 30 PhD students. They 
are Frank Proschan (1959, Stanford), Donald Roberts (1960, Stanford), Donald 
Iglehart  (1961,  Stanford),  Murray  Geisler  (1962,  Stanford),  Menahem  Yaari 
(1962, Stanford), Louis Billera (1968, City University of New York), and the rest 
all  graduated  from  Yale,  Rolf  Mantel  (1965),  Ana  Martirena-Mantel  (1965), 
Duncan  Foley  (1966),  Eugene  Poirier  (1966),  Terje  Hansen  (1968),  Michael 
Keren (1968), Frank Levy (1969), Yukio Noguchi (1972), Michael Todd (1972), 
John Shoven (1973), John Walley (1973), Andrew Feltenstein (1976), Marcos 
Fonseca (1978), Timothy Kehoe (1979), Ludo van der Heyden (1979), Jaime Serra Puche (1979), Andrew Caplin (1983), Phillip White (1983), Kazuya Kamiya 
(1986), Joshua Reichert (1986), Michael Mandler (1989), Jingang Zhao (1992), 
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